



# A min entropy uncertainty relation for finite size cryptography

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# The Cryptography World

- ▶ Protection of information in a communication process.
- ▶ Conventional cryptography: protection against eavesdropping Eve.
- ▶ Main example: Key establishment
- ▶ QKD: information theoretic security based on quantum physics!




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
# More challenges: two-party protocols

- ▶ Secure function evaluation, involving two distrustful parties.
- ▶ **No Eve!!**
- ▶ Security requirements: If one party is honest, the other possible cheating party cannot gain further information than provided by the outcome.





# Example: Selling a tractor



$D(x, y) = \text{no}$  if  $x > y$  (Bob's offered price below Alice's asking price)  
 $y$  if  $x \leq y$  (Sold at offered price, at least or higher than Alice's asking price)

- ▶ Other examples: bit commitment, 1-2 oblivious transfer etc.

Are such fundamental 2-party protocols achievable by quantum cryptography?

- ▶ Quantum bit commitment is impossible
  - ▶ H.K. Lo, H. F. Chau (quant-ph/9605026)
  - ▶ D. Mayers (quant-ph/9605044)
- ▶ One-sided two-party computations are impossible
  - ▶ H.K.Lo (quant-ph/9611031)
- ▶ Extension of impossibility proofs for bit commitment
  - ▶ G.M.D'Ariano, D. Kretschmann, D. Schlingemann, R.F.Werner (quant-ph/0605224)

Is this the end??

## Quantum assumptions

- ▶ General limitations
  - ▶ Attacker cannot act on multiple qubits simultaneously (Salvail, <http://www.cki.au.dk/pub/crypt.dvi>)
  - ▶ Relativistic theory (Kent, [quant-ph/1101.4620](http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/1101.4620))
- ▶ Resource limitations
  - ▶ Bounded quantum storage (Damgaard, Fehr, Salvail, Schaffner, [quant-ph/0508222](http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0508222))

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
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# Noisy Storage Model



- ▶ Quantum memory is in general bounded and subjected to noise.<sup>1</sup> (Wehner, Schaffner, Terhal, quant-ph/0711.2895)
- ▶ Quantum Protocol: Weak String Erasure
  - ▶ Provides Alice a random binary (classical) string  $X^n$ , and Bob a random substring  $X_{\mathcal{I}}$  with the set of location indices  $\mathcal{I}$ .



<sup>1</sup> Not in contradiction with memories used for quantum repeaters.

# $(n, \lambda, \epsilon)$ -WSE

$t = t_0$



$X^n = \{0,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,\dots\}$

String	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	...
Alice's basis	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_X$	...
Quantum state	$\nearrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\nearrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\searrow$	$\uparrow$	$\searrow$	...
Bob's basis	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_X$	$\sigma_Z$	$\sigma_Z$	...



$X_I = \{0,1,1,0,1,\dots\}$   
 $I = \{1,3,4,7,8,\dots\}$

- ▶ Security for Alice: Bob's knowledge of  $X^n$  is limited, i.e.
- ▶ Security for Bob: Alice does not learn about  $I$ .
- ▶ WSE protocol + classical information post-processing  $\rightarrow$  fundamental secure 2-party protocols! (OT, BC etc)


$$H_{\min}^{\epsilon}(X^n|B) \geq \lambda n.$$

# $(n, \lambda, \epsilon)$ -WSE

$t = t_0 + \Delta t$




$X^n = \{0,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,\dots\}$



- ▶ Security for Alice: Bob's knowledge of  $X^n$  is limited, i.e.  $H_{\min}^\epsilon(X^n|B) \geq \lambda n$ .
- ▶ Security for Bob: Alice does not learn about  $I$ .
- ▶ WSE protocol + classical information post-processing  $\rightarrow$  fundamental secure 2-party protocols! (OT, BC etc)

# The Shield: Entropic Uncertainty Relations

- ▶ Fundamental principle: Description of the inherent randomness coming from the uncertainty in outcomes for non-commuting measurements.
- ▶ Importance: Bounds the amount of information that a possible adversary has access to.
- ▶ Quantities of interest:



# Main Challenges

Goal: making min-entropy per bit large!

– more tolerance against losses and errors in implementations

- ▶ Tight/optimal bounds for quantum side information
  - ▶ Previously linked to channel capacities:
    - Classical capacity (quant-ph/0906.1030)
    - Entanglement cost (quant-ph/1108.5357)
  - ▶ WSE using six-states instead of BB84 can be linked to quantum capacity(quant-ph/1111.2026)
- ▶ Finite size effects
  - ▶ Tight bounds for in QKD (Tomamichel, Lim, Gisin, Renner/arXiv:1103.4130)

Approach:

Derive uncertainty relations w.r.t. classical information first, then include conditioning on quantum information by considering classical capacity of quantum channels obeying strong converse (better understood)

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# How much uncertainty can we obtain?

Scenario:

Consider an arbitrary  $n$  qubit state  $\rho$ , where Bob holds arbitrary classical information  $K$  about the state. An honest Alice performs random BB84 measurements upon the state, obtaining a string of outcomes  $X^n \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . What is the min-entropy of Bob's total information about  $X^n$ ?

Close to Shannon entropy!

(Damgaard, Fehr, Renner, Salvail, Schaffner, quant-ph/0612014)

$$H_{\min}^{\epsilon}(X^n | \Theta^n K) \geq \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta\right) n, \quad \text{where } \epsilon = \exp\left[-\frac{\delta^2 n}{128(2 + \log \frac{2}{\delta})^2}\right]$$

- ▶ Error parameter  $\epsilon$  can be reasonably small in the large  $n$  limit.
- ▶ How large should  $n$  be? **Ans:** For small  $\epsilon \approx 0.1$  and  $\delta \approx 0.01$ ,  $n \gtrsim 10^8$ !

Our results:

$$H_{\min}^{\epsilon}(X^n | \Theta^n K) \geq c_{BB84} n,$$

$$c_{BB84} := \max_{s \in (0,1]} \frac{1}{s} \left[ 1 + s - \log(1 + 2^s) - \frac{1}{sn} \log \frac{2}{\epsilon^2} \right]$$

- ▶ Crucial idea: Bounding the min-entropy by a class of conditional Renyi entropies, and maximizing over all obtained bounds.
- ▶ How large should  $n$  be? **Ans: For  $\epsilon \approx 0.1$ ,  $\delta \approx 0.01$ ,  $n \gtrsim 10^4$  is sufficient!**
- ▶ Similarly tight results obtained for six-state measurements.

## Steps in proof: (a rough sketch)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 H_{\alpha}(X | \Theta) \\
 \downarrow \\
 H_{\alpha}(X^n | \Theta^n) \\
 \downarrow \\
 H_{\alpha}(X^n | \Theta^n K) \\
 \downarrow \\
 H_{\min}^{\epsilon}(X^n | \Theta^n K)
 \end{array}$$

extension to  
quantum side information


Let  $F$  be a quantum channel satisfying strong converse. Then

$$H_{\min}^{\epsilon}(X^n | \Theta^n K F(Q)) \geq -\log P_{\text{succ}}^F [ H_{\min}^{\epsilon/2}(X^n | \Theta^n K) - \log(2/\epsilon) ]$$

- Theoretical optimization over all states of conditional  $\alpha$ -Renyi entropies, for a single qubit.
  - ▶ Reformulation in terms of spherical coordinates.
  - ▶ Invoking the Bloch sphere condition as constraint for an arbitrary single-qubit density matrix.
- Generalization to an arbitrary  $n$ -qubit state  $\rho$ .
- Further conditioning on classical information  $K$ .
  - ▶ Coincides with  $H_{\alpha}(X^n | \Theta^n)_{\rho}$ , due to the fact that  $\Theta^n$  and  $K$  are independent from each other.
- Link to min-entropy.
  - ▶ Tomamichel, Colbeck, Renner/arXiv:0811.1221



## A new bound for min-entropy




$$c = \frac{H_{\min}^{\epsilon}(X^n | \Theta^n K)}{n}$$

# Application: Bit Commitment in Noisy Storage Model

Ng, Joshi, Chia, Kurtseifer, Wehner/arXiv:1205.3331

- ▶ For security, we need  $H_{min}^\epsilon(X^n|B) \gtrsim 0.47n$ .
- ▶ Reasons: 1) Making protocol robust against QBER = 4.1%.  
2) Minimal classical information processing while considering finite size effects.
- ▶ Perform bit commitment by sending  $2.5 \times 10^5$  qubits during WSEE<sup>2</sup>.



<sup>2</sup>Modified version of WSE to include robustness against losses and errors

## Conclusion

- ▶ New uncertainty relation provides improved bounds, substantially decreasing the amount of information post-processing required.
- ▶ For  $n = 2.5 \times 10^5$ ,  $\epsilon = 2 \times 10^{-5}$ , we performed secure bit commitment under a quantum storage assumption of 972 qubits undergoing low depolarizing noise of  $r=0.9$  (or 928 qubits stored in noiseless memory).

## Comments and Open problems

- ▶ Demonstrates feasibility of fundamental two-party protocols in NSM.
  - ▶ Motivates more construction of useful protocols using WSE, for ex: secure identification.
- ▶ Tight relations for quantum side information
  - ▶ To prove security of WSE for a larger range of quantum channels.

The End

Thank you!