Single-Photon Detector Tutorial

Krister Shalm


National Institute of Standards and Technology Boulder, CO USA

Burm Baek
Brice Calkins
Shellee Dyer
Thomas Gerrits
Scott Glancy
Sean Harrington
Antia Lamas Linares

Adriana Lita
Manny Knill
Francesco Marsili
Aaron Miller (Albion
College)
Richard Mirin
Sae Woo Nam


Jeff Shainline Marty Stevens Igor Vayshenker Varun Verma

Have detectors. Will travel.










Source: http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/purity.png

It is impossible to make anything foolproof because fools are so ingenious. It is impossible to make anything hackerproof because hackers are so ingenious.


Tutorial Topics

- a. Single-photon sources and the properties of light
- b. Photo multiplier detectors
- c. Single-photon avalanche detectors
- d. Detector properties and definitions
- e. Transition edge sensors
- a. Single-photon nanowire detectors
- f. Hack attacks


Color




Polarization



The Poincaré Sphere





Spatial properties



Number/Fock States


$$|n\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n!}} (\hat{a}^{\dagger})^n |0\rangle$$






Coherent State

$$|\alpha\rangle = e^{-\frac{1}{2}|\alpha|^2} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{\alpha^n}{\sqrt{n!}} |n\rangle$$




Thermal State


$$P(n) = \frac{\mu^n}{(1+\mu)^{n+1}}$$




Photon bunching is directly related to the boson sampling problem by Scott Aaronson and Alex Arkhipov




Spontaneous Parametric Downconversion





$$k_p = k_1 + k_2$$






http://www.dancingphysicist.com/spdcalc




Properties of an ideal photon detector

- Detects all the incident light
- Insensitive to wavelength
- No noise
- Insensitive to polarization
- Can resolve the number of photons hitting it
- Good timing information (jitter)






Photon number resolution: can the detector distinguish the number of photons hitting it.




"Click" detectors: Can only tell the difference between the presence of photons and no photons.


Using multiple "click" detectors to obtain number resolution




Photoelectric Effect




http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5JCm5FY-dEY





Photomultiplier tubes



Photomultiplier tubes









- H. lams and B. Salzberg, Proc. IRE 23, 55 (1935)
- V. Zworykin, G. Morton, and L. Malter, Proc. IRE 24, 351 (1935).
- L. A. Kubetsky, Proc. Inst. Radio Eng. 254, 421 (1937).
- J. S. Allen, Phys. Rev. 55, 966-971 (1939).

Single-Photon Avalanche Diodes (SPAD)






Eisaman et al., Rev. Sci. Instrum. 82, 071101 (2011); doi: 10.1063/1.3610677

Detector properties and terminology


Efficiency: probability that a photon will be detected.






Igor Vayshenker


Typical Silicon based SPAD efficiency curve




Timing latency: how long it takes from the photon being absorbed until the electrical pulse can be measured.





Jitter: variation in the detection time of a detector.



SPAD Tradeoff








Reality


For commercial devices can get efficiency of \sim 70% with a jitter of \sim 400 ps or efficiency of \sim 30% with a jitter of 50 ps (at 700 nm).

Dark Counts: counts a detector registers when no light from our source is incident on it.




- 1) Stray light
- 2) Thermal fluctuations creating spurious e-h pairs that trigger the device

After Pulsing: correlated false counts that happen some time after the initial detection event.





Recovery time: how long it takes before a detector is ready to detect the next photon.



Quenching: reduce the voltage bias so that trapped charges cannot trigger another avalanche.

SPAD Tradeoff: Lower operating temperatures leads to lower dark counts (good), but increases the probability of after pulsing (bad)






New: No Gating required


Yan et al., Rev. Sci. Instrum. 83, 073105 (2012)

http://www.perkinelmer.com/CMSResources/Images/44-12462DTS_SPCM%20AQRH.pdf

http://www.idquantique.com/images/stories/PDF/id201-single-photon-counter/id201-specs.pdf




Superconducting Transition Edge Sensors




Number resolving capabilities. Detection efficiency of ~98% using a cavity structure from ~200-2000 nm. No intrinsic dark counts.

Sample Pulse traces, 1550 nm




Jitter typically \sim 200+ ns. Can be made <10ns with special read out electronics. Can suffer from "pile up".


Photon number resolution





Superconducting Nanowire Detectors



Superconducting Nanowire Detectors








Eisaman et al., Rev. Sci. Instrum. 82, 071101 (2011); doi: 10.1063/1.3610677

Superconducting Nanowire Detectors



Marsili et al., Nature Photonics 7, 210-214 (2013)

Jitter <50 ps. Efficiency up to 93%. Fast recovery times. Broadband operation. Downside: efficiency depends on polarization.

Table of properties

Detector Type	Efficiency	Dark Counts/s	Jitter	Max Count Rate (10^6)	Surface Area	Operating Temperature
PMT	40% @ 500 nm	100	~300 ps	10	~cm^2	300 K
Si APD	70% @ 700nm	25	~400 ps	10	~100 um^2	250 K
TES	98%	~0	100 ns (<10 ns)	0.1	~40 um^2	0.1 K
Nanowires	93% @ 1550nm	~100	30-50 ps	1000	~25 um ^2	1-3 K

aser

Attack Vectors / Side Channels

Photon properties:

- a. Wavelength
- b. Polarization
- c. Spatial mode
- d. Photon statistics

Detector properties:

- a. Efficiency
- b. Jitter
- c. Recovery time
- d. Dark counts
- e. After pulsing
- f. Packaging / read out electronics





Holy sh*t! Smart toilet hack attack!


Free app lets anyone remotely harass toilet's occupant, run up water bill.

by Sean Gallagher - Aug 4 2013, 5:30pm EDT



Information security firm Trustwave has reported a potential cyber-attack vector to a device you may have never expected the phrase "security vulnerability" would be applied (other than in reference to the end of a toilet paper roll, that is). In an advisory issued August 1, Trustwave warned of a Bluetooth security vulnerability in Inax's Satis automatic toilet.

Blinding Attacks



V. Makarov, New J. Phys. 11 065003 (2009) http://www.vad1.com/publications/

It is impossible to make anything hackerproof because hackers are so ingenious.

Moral: we have some work to do.

