


Quantum Secure Direct Communication with Mutual Authentication using a Single Basis

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Introduction to QSDC



- In classical cryptography, sending a secret message always requires a key.
- Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) can transmit secret messages over a quantum channel directly without any key.
- Predefined encoding and decoding rules.

Simulation of the protocol in IBM quantum device

- We have executed this protocol in the IBMQ Armonk Device.
- The effect of noise is equivalent to a bit-flip error.
- The effect of noise does not depend on the choice of basis.
- We model an ideal quantum channel as a series of identity gates.
- In a realistic scenario, the channel no longer behaves as identity.
- A minimal overhead of a 3-qubit repetition code is sufficient to protect this protocol against noise.

QSDC using a Single Basis


- Alice's and Bob's k -bit identities Id_A and Id_B .
- Θ be a predefined set of angles with cardinality N .
- $\Theta = \{x^\circ : x \text{ is an integer and } 1 \leq x \leq 360\}$.
- For each $\theta \in \Theta$, the unitary matrix U_θ is defined as

$$U_\theta = \begin{pmatrix} \cos \theta & -\sin \theta \\ \sin \theta & \cos \theta \end{pmatrix}.$$

- Then $U_\theta |0\rangle = \cos \theta |0\rangle + \sin \theta |1\rangle$, and $U_\theta |1\rangle = -\sin \theta |0\rangle + \cos \theta |1\rangle$.

Results of simulation in IBM Quantum Device

Action of noise in real quantum device




Performance when Alice sends 0.

Performance when Alice sends 1.


The Protocol

- Alice's secret message M . She Encodes M as $0 \rightarrow U_\theta |0\rangle$, $1 \rightarrow U_\theta |1\rangle$ and Prepares sequence Q_A^1 .
- Prepares qubit sequences I_A , I_B , Q_θ corresponding to Id_A , Id_B and θ .
- Inserts I_A , I_B , Q_θ in Q_A^1 and sends Bob.
- Alice and Bob authenticate each other using I_A and I_B .
- Bob gets the value of θ from Q_θ .
- He decodes the message M by measuring the qubits of Q_A^1 in $\{U_\theta |0\rangle, U_\theta |1\rangle\}$.

Block diagram of the Protocol




| List of variables | |
|-------------------|--------------------|
| M | Secret message |
| θ | Random angle |
| Id_A | Identity of Alice |
| Id_B | Identity of Bob |
| r | Random number |
| D_A | Decoy qubits |
| I_A | Qubits of Id_A |
| I_B | Qubits of Id_B |
| Q_θ | Qubits of θ |
| Q_A^1 | Qubits sequence |



Effect of the length of the channel

Estimation of the probability of correct transmission as a function of channel length



Estimated functions for success probability for varying channel length.

Conclusion

- This is a one-step one-way quantum communication protocol.
- It does not use entanglement as a resource.
- Secure against all the familiar attack strategies.
- Our protocol is quite robust to error.
- A simple distance 3 repetition code is sufficient for reliable communication in the presence of noise.

References

Das, N., Paul, G., & Majumdar, R., arXiv:2101.03577, (2021).