


Provably-secure quantum randomness expansion with untrusted homodyne detection secure against quantum side-information

Ignatius W. Primateamaja¹, Jianran Zhang², Jing Yan Haw², Raymond Ho², Gong Zhang², Chao Wang², Charles C.-W. Lim^{1,2}

¹ Centre for Quantum Technologies, ² Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
National University of Singapore

Key message: homodyne-based QRNGs have the following practical advantages...

But on the other hand, it is...


chip-based implementation


fast
(high bandwidth)


cost-effective



room temperature
(no cooling required)


complicated
(i.e., difficult to model accurately)

Why untrusted measurement?

- The complexity of homodyne detector makes it difficult to characterise.
- An adversary could bias the measurement outcome of the homodyne detector. [For example, see Smith et al., *P.R. Applied* **15**, 044044 (2021)]

Protocol



For key generation round:
Set $|\psi_x\rangle = |\alpha\rangle$ and measure P -quadrature

For each (x, y) :
Set a winning condition $b_{x,y}$.

In the **parameter estimation** step, we estimate the winning frequency. Abort if it deviates too much from the expected winning probability.

Some homodyne/heterodyne-based semi-DI-QRNGs

Reference	source	measurement	side information
Marangon et al., <i>PRL</i> (2017)	untrusted 😊	trusted ☹️	quantum 😊
Michel et al., <i>P.R. Applied</i> (2018)	untrusted 😊	trusted ☹️	quantum 😊
Avesani et al., <i>Nat. Comms.</i> (2018)	untrusted 😊	trusted ☹️	quantum 😊
Rusca et al., <i>Appl. Phys. Lett.</i> (2020)	energy 😊	untrusted 😊	classical 😊
Avesani et al., <i>P.R. Applied</i> (2021)	energy 😊	untrusted 😊	classical 😊
This work*	trusted ☹️	untrusted 😊	quantum 😊


Randomness certification

Assumptions:

- Quantum theory is correct.
- Alice has a characterised source of quantum states.
- Bob could securely store his measurement outcomes.
- Alice and Bob have some trusted and private random seed.

NOTE: we do not assume the measured states to be i.i.d.

Method:






Experimental setup and characterisations

Experimental setup:

Legends:


EDFA: erbium-doped fibre amplifier
IM: intensity modulator
PM: phase modulator
PC: polarisation controller
WPD: waveguide-coupled photodiode
ESA: electronic spectrum analyser



Noise spectrum

Clearance

Main result: randomness expansion rate



16-QAM protocol: positive net randomness expansion with block length of $>10^8$

Security parameters:

$$\epsilon_{com} = 10^{-4}$$

$$\epsilon_{sound} = 10^{-8}$$

If you have further questions, you can drop me an email at william_primateamaja@u.nus.edu