Loopholes in implementations of quantum cryptography

Vadim Makarov (Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

 

Quantum key distribution is proven unconditionally secure for an idealized model of equipment. However in recent years numerous discrepancies between the real cryptographic hardware and its model in the security proof have been discovered, leading to practically exploitable loopholes [1-13]. I will review several latest attacks. I will also discuss briefly different approaches to closing these loopholes [14-19].

Slides from this talk will be available after the conference at http://www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/other.html.

 

[1] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo, "Quantum hacking: experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems," Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008).

[2] F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, "Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system," New J. Phys. 12, 113026 (2010).

[3] V. Makarov, "Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light," New J. Phys. 11, 065003 (2009).

[4] S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, "Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light," arXiv:0809.3408 [quant-ph].

[5] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, "Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination," Nat. Photon. 4, 686 (2010).

[6] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, "Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography," Opt. Express 18, 27938 (2010).

[7] C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, Ch. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, "After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem," New J. Phys. 13, 013043 (2011).

[8] N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, "Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution," arXiv:1103.2327 [quant-ph].

[9] L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, "Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography," arXiv:1106.2119 [quant-ph].

[10] L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, "Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination," arXiv:1106.2396 [quant-ph].

[11] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, "Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system," Nat. Commun. 2, 349 (2011).

[12] S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, "Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system," Phys. Rev. A 83, 062331 (2011).

[13] H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M, Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, "Quantum eavesdropping without interception: An attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors," New J. Phys. 13, 073024 (2011).

[14] Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, "Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD," Nat. Photonics 4, 800 (2010).

[15] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, "Reply to 'Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD'," Nat. Photonics 4, 801 (2010).

[16] Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography," Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104 (2011).

[17] L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, "Comment on 'Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography'," arXiv:1106.3756 [quant-ph].

[18] Ø. Marøy, L. Lydersen, and J. Skaar, "Security of quantum key distribution with arbitrary individual imperfections," Phys. Rev. A 82, 032337 (2010).

[19] L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, "Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography," Phys. Rev. A 83, 032306 (2011).